



DTM Update

RWG, 29 January 2019

DTM Data as of Dec 31 2018 (Round 107)



Returnees



4,165,320
Individuals



694,220
Families


As of Dec 31	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014
# of individuals	4,165,320	3,220,362	1,370,862	468,780	-




51,696 returnees, mostly to Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Anbar.

In 2018, DTM recorded 944,958 new returnees.

Governorates Ranked by Number of Returnees




Districts Ranked by Number of Returnees



Returns and Shelter


- Nearly all families have returned to a habitual residence in good condition and 2% are living in other private settings (host families and rented accommodation).
- 3% of returnees (132,774) are living in the most vulnerable conditions in critical shelters, an increase in the figure from 130,350 recorded in round 106.




- Of those living in critical shelters, 85% are in three governorates: 43% in Ninewa, 23% in Salah al-Din and 19% in Diyala. The top three districts hosting returnees living in a critical shelter are: Mosul, Tikrit, and Ramadi.

IDP Districts of Origin

IDPs come from 51 districts across 8 governorates:
 10 in Baghdad,
 9 in Ninewa,
 9 in Salah al-Din,
 8 in Anbar,
 6 in Diyala,
 4 in Babylon,
 4 in Kirkuk and
 1 in Erbil.



Top 5 IDP Districts of Origin




National: 50% of all IDPs come from just five districts in two governorates. Of these, the top four districts are all in Ninewa Governorate: Mosul (17%), Sinjar (17%), Telafar (6%) and Al Ba'aj (6%) while the fifth district Ramadi is in Anbar (85,860, 5%).

Governorate: The top five districts of origin make up the vast majority of IDPs in each governorate. In 11 of the 18 governorates, the top five districts of origin account for more than 80% of all IDPs and in 7 governorates more than 65%.

Return Index

Return Index Report #2

- This second report builds on the Round 1 Report released last September; it presents data collected in October as well as some comparisons with Round 1.



- Results show that 401, 166 returnees -10%- are living in 232 locations with Very High/High severity conditions, the majority of which are located in Ninewa.
- As reference, Round 1 had 442, 434 – 11%- in VH and High
- 1 504 vs 1 427 locations: 77 new return locations in the 3 months



Hotspot Example: Sinjar Centre

Return rates in Sinjar remain stalled when comparing Round 1 and Round 2 data: less than half of the pre-conflict population has returned.

Residential destruction is one of the most critical issues affecting all neighbourhoods. There are still reportedly few functioning private sector businesses and little market functionality. There is a **scarcity of goods** in the markets in 70% of locations and, in 20% of locations, markets remain closed. Even though daily public life is reportedly calm in about half of the locations (an increase from previous rounds), there is a **general deterioration in safety concerns**.

All locations report concerns about **ethno-religious tension** compared with 20% in the previous round. Residents are also now more concerned about **perceived threats from ISIL-related attacks** in all but one location. Similarly, there are now three new locations where there are now concerns over clashes between armed groups. Finally, issues associated with the **illegal occupation of houses** remain present in 73% of locations.



Return Index 2.0

- Data collection finished end Dec 2018
- Model is currently being re-designed, every indicator re-weighted
- Example of changes:

Original RI	New RI
Is the land being farmed?	Are the regular agricultural or livestock activities that take place in your location over the course of a year taking place again? Are farmers from this location able to buy and sell agricultural products in nearby markets and establishments (including government ones)?
Are the markets and bazaars functioning?	How easy is it for residents to access and obtain basic items and food for their daily subsistence in nearby markets?
None	Can residents in this location find employment?
None	Are residents from this location able to access nearby functioning offices/courts for civil and criminal justice matters?
None	Are there displaced families originally from this location who are not allowed to return?

Protracted Displacement



Protracted Displacement Analysis

Using the latest available DTM dataset, it was found that 80% of all out-of-camp IDPs can be found in the top 20 districts of displacement, and 90% in the top 32 districts. Each of them is being analysed to provide factsheets presenting:

1. Main, Medium and Low Recipient Districts

The relative weight in terms of displacement, i.e. districts could be rated as “main”, “medium” and “low” recipients of IDPs

2. Stationary vs Dynamic Districts

The variability of displacement, i.e. districts where displaced households are not or very slowly moving out of their location of displacement could be rated as “stationary”, while districts where families are moving out at a faster pace can be rated as “dynamic”.

3. Homogeneous vs Heterogeneous Districts

Based on district of origin, period of displacement as well as ethno-religious affiliation

4. IDPs profiling: Conditions in Displacement, Intentions, Socio-Demographic Profile, Vulnerabilities, etc



Example: Akre

DISPLACED HHs	5,467 HHS (3% of all IDPs)	LOW RECIPIENT
RATE OF CHANGE	-5%	STATIONARY
ORIGIN	83% MOSUL 12% AL-HAMDANIYA 2% TELAFAR 2% TILKAIF 1% SINJAR	HOMOGENEOUS 100% INTRA-GOVERNORATE
PERIOD/WAVE	55% JUNE-JULY 2014 43% AUGUST 2014 POST JULY 2017	HOMOGENEOUS 98% PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT
ETHNO-RELIGIOUS	64% KURD SUNNI 21% SHABAK SUNNI 13% SHABAK SHIA 1% CHALDEAN 1% ASSYRIAN CHRISTIAN	HOMOGENEOUS 100% ETHNIC MINORITIES



Protracted Displacement: Next Steps


- Produce similar analysis for districts of origin, using return index and other existing data
- Link both to inform implementation
 - If working with returnees in a district of origin, be able to know where the remaining caseload of that area is located and what their obstacles are
 - Targeting districts of displacement with specific conditions or with groups less likely to return
 - Develop linkages between implementing activities in areas of return and knowing where the IDP caseload is going to be affected and potentially returning
- Collect missing pieces of the puzzle
 - Ranking of reasons for non-return
 - Reasons that are necessary vs optional
 - Intentions vs decision-making/planning



Return Index Thematic Series:
The Physical and Social Dimensions of
Housing in Conflict-Affected Areas

Return Index Housing Indicators

- The physical and social dimensions of housing are the two most significant indicators within the return index. The two indicators are:
 - Levels of house destruction and severe damage (Livelihoods and basic services scale)
 - Presence of illegal house occupation (social cohesion and safety perceptions scale)
- They are the leading indicator used to calculate the score for each scale




Maximum potential score is set at 100. A location presenting severe conditions in all indicators would receive a score 100.

House Destruction

- In 72% of the 1,504 locations assessed, up to 50% of houses were severely damaged or destroyed
- In 66 locations (4%), more than 50% of houses were severely damaged or destroyed


Indicator Options

- 50% or more of the houses in the location are still destroyed or severely damaged
- Less than 50% of the houses in the location are still destroyed or severely damaged
- There are no houses destroyed or severely damaged



Housing Destruction Geographical Hotspots

- Mosul Centre
- Telafar Centre
- Al-Shirqat
- Tikrit Centre
- Muqdaduya
- Saadiya
- Jalawla
- Heet and
- the Ramadi-Falluja strip



Housing Destruction: Further Findings

Poverty Levels

- The areas with the most house destruction are also those that have historically had high levels of poverty.
- Subdistricts with a more severe house destruction indicator tend to have an above-average amount of families living under the poverty line.
- *This matters because...* it highlights the need to pay attention to the existing underlying circumstances existent in locations where conflict inflicted the most onerous burden.

Reconstruction

- When comparing the likelihood of house reconstruction with the overall severity of conditions (both from RI data), it appears that the worse the state of general living conditions, the less likely it is that house reconstruction is taking place.
- *This matters because...* it highlights the positive spillovers effects of overall community revitalization and infrastructure rehabilitation in encouraging houses reconstruction.


Housing Destruction: Further Findings

Community Dynamics

- 1 out of 4 locations with some degree of house destruction is located within ethno-religiously diverse subdistricts.
- Locations with ethno-religious diversity and severe social cohesion and safety issues appear more likely to have more housing destruction than those with homogeneous populations or less severe social cohesion and safety issues.
- *This matters because...* targeted house destruction may be a consequence of pre-existing low cohesion as well as the source of ongoing social problems,

Hotspots:


- Zummar
- Ayadhiya
- Sinuni
- Sinjar Centre
- Telafar Centre
- Tooz Khormatu
- Suleiman Beg and
- Balad Centre





Illegal House Occupation

- Housing, land, and property issues, which range from lack of documentation to disputed ownership due to legacies of appropriation, are longstanding in Iraq. The indicator linked to these issues in the Return Index **focuses specifically on illegal occupation of housing** that took place during or after the recent conflict.
- Unlike house destruction, **illegal occupation of housing is not widespread across all conflict-affected governorates but more targeted to specific areas**
- Geographical hotspots of illegal house occupation are mainly in Ninewa and Salah al-Din.





Illegal House Occupation

- While the Return Index does not capture information on who specifically is occupying housing, additional follow-up with key informants in these locations indicates that they are **mainly used as offices and barracks by security forces**. These residences usually belong to people who are still displaced. In some cases, these people are not allowed to return and in others, this occupation is the reason they continue to be displaced.
- Over half of the hotspots listed above fall within **the disputed internal borders of Iraq**. Many of these locations have histories of forced population change and unresolved HLP concerns. These have the potential to exacerbate house occupation resulting from this most recent conflict, whether this occupation is by security forces, neighbors or others.